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This paper analyses the exercise decision of non-exclusive real options in
a two-player setting. A general model of non-exclusive real options, allowing
the underlying asset to follow any strong Markov process is developed, thus
extending the existing literature, which is mainly based on one-dimensional
geometric Brownian motion. For games with a rst-moveradvantage it is proved
that an equilibrium with the rent-equalisation property exists. As an example,
a duopoly where two rms can adopt a new technology, whose protability
follows a two-dimensional, correlated geometric Brownian motion is studied.
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11 Introduction
Ever since the seminal contributions of Brennan and Schwartz (1985), McDonald
and Siegel (1986), and Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the standard approach in invest-
ment appraisal has been to view projects as (real) options, the valuation and optimal
exercise decision of which have, consequently, to be determined by applying the prin-
ciples of (nancial) option pricing established by Black/Scholes/Merton.Contrary to
their nancial counterparts, however, real options are typically non-exclusive. This
introduces a game theoretic dimension that is absent in standard option pricing
models.
The literature on non-exclusive options has, so far, been relatively sparse. This
is mainly due to the mathematical intricacies of timing games in continuous time.
The main problem is that, in continuous time, the \time instant immediately after
time t" is not well-dened (cf. Simon (1987a), Simon (1987b), and Simon and
Stinchcombe (1989)).
Many situations in which non-exclusive real options arise have a so-called \rst
mover advantage". Consider, for example, two rms that have the option to adopt
a new technology. The rm that adopts rst can have an advantage over its rival
due to additional prots that may accrue from the technological innovation. Such a
model has been analysed in a deterministic, continuous time setting by Fudenberg
and Tirole (1985). They show that, in equilibrium, the two rms will try to preempt
each other. In fact, equilibrium strategies are such that both rms' discounted prot
streams equal that of the case in which they are not the rst rm to invest. In other
words, in equilibrium there is rent equalisation.
In the game analysed in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) a particular coordination
problem arises, as there are situations where the rst mover advantage leads to
an environment where it is protable for one { and only one { rm to invest. In
continuous time there is no easy way to deal with this problem. Essentially there
are only two possibilities: either rm always invests, whereas the other rm never
invests. Both constitute a (pure strategy) equilibrium. These ar, however, not
intuitively appealing. How and why would rms coordinate on either equilibrium?
By using a technique from optimal control theory Fudenberg and Tirole (1985)
introduce the possibility of a mixed strategy, which leads to the result that each rm
invests with probability 1/2, which is an intuitively appealing result. Furthermore,
joint investment occurs with zero probability.
These ideas have also been applied { explicitly or implicitly { to game-theoretic
extensions of real option models.1 The technique used in most models is a direct,
1See, for example, Smets (1991), Grenadier (2000), Huisman (2001), Huisman and Kort (1999),
2or simplied, application of the concepts of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). In fact,
in many cases the coordination problem mentioned earlier is dealt with by sim-
ply assuming that rms invest with equal probability and that joint investment is
impossible, i.e. rms toss a fair coin to solve the coordination problem.
By default, however, non-exclusive real option models deal with uncertainty and,
hence, with stopping times instead of deterministic time. Therefore, much of the
analysis in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) is not directly applicable to models with
uncertainty. Furthermore, the actual technique used by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985)
does not have an intuitive interpretation and is merely a tool to obtain results
in continuous time. A rst step towards a formal analysis of non-exclusive real
options is provided by Murto (2004), who considers exit in a duopoly with declining
protability. In that paper, however, the coordination problem does not arise and
an equilibrium in pure strategies can be found. Murto (2004) uses ideas introduced
by Dutta and Rustichini (1995). In this framework, the protability of each rm
depends (deterministically) on how many rms are present in the industry and a
random part, which follows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM). The rms then
each choose a stopping set and exit as soon as the GBM hits their stopping set.
In this paper, the Dutta and Rustichini (1995) and Murto (2004) framework is
extended in several ways. Firstly, I adapt and embed the method of Fudenberg and
Tirole (1985) to solve the coordination problem in the basic set-up of Murto (2004).
Secondly, I prove existence of equilibrium for non-exclusive real options where the
underlying asset follows a general, possibly higher dimensional, Markov process.
It is shown that there exists an equilibrium in which the rent-equalisation principle
holds for this general class of games. Finally, the equilibrium results are applied to a
situation where two rms can invest in a project. The set-up is similar to Huisman
(2001, Chapter 7), i.e. each rm's prots consists of a deterministic part, which
depends on the number of rms having invested, and a random part. The novelty
here is that each rm's prots is subject to dierent, but possibly correlated, GBMs.
This introduces an asymmetry in an otherwise symmetric model. It is shown that
there are three possible investment scenarios. Two in which one rm acts as if it
were an exogenously determined Stackelberg leader whereas the other rm acts as
a Stackelberg follower, and one in which both rms try to preempt each other. In
the latter case it holds that joint investment occurs with probability zero. A similar
result is well-known for models based on a one-dimensional GBM and is basically
due to the continuous sample paths of GBM. However, the probability with which
each rm invests is not equal to 0.5 (a.s.). This result indicates that one has to be
Weeds (2002), and Thijssen et al. (2006).
3careful with imposing exogenous assumptions on the solution to the coordination
problem (like the \coin toss" mentioned earlier).
1.1 An illustrative example
To obtain some insight in the problem at hand, consider the following example. It
is a basic version of models analysed in Smets (1991), Dixit and Pindyck (1994,
Section 9.3), and Huisman (2001, Chapter 7). There are two symmetric rms, both
of whom can invest in a new technology by investing a xed cost I > 0. The prots
accruing from this project are driven by two main factors: an underlying geometric
Brownian motion, (Yt)t0, and the \investment status" of each rm. Let kl(Y ),
k;l = 0;1, denote the prots of a rm where k indicates its investment status (k = 1
if invested, k = 0 otherwise) and l denotes the competitor's investment status. For
all Y it is assumed that 10(Y ) > 11(Y ) > 00(Y )  01(Y ). Furthermore, it is
assumed that there is a rst mover advantage: 10(Y ) 00(Y ) > 11(Y ) 00(Y ).
What are equilibrium investment strategies?
The way this question is answered is by drawing an analogy with a Stackelberg
model. There are, basically, three possibilities: a rm invest rst (becomes leader),
does not invest rst (becomes follower), or both rms invest simultaneously. The
expected discounted prots for these scenarios, if rst investment takes place at



















Figure 1: Payo functions.
In Figure 1, the value YF denotes the optimal investment trigger for the follower
and YP denotes the \preemption point", i.e. the point where each rm prefers to be
4the leader, rather than the follower. In a subgame perfect equilibrium, both rms
will immediately invest as soon as Yt  YF. Conversely, for Yt < YP, neither rm
will invest. The interesting region is Yt 2 [YP;YF].
There are two asymmetric equilibria, namely where either rm always invests
as soon as [YP;YF] is reached and the other never invests. There is, however, no a
priori reason why rms would coordinate on these equilibria. In order to construct a
symmetric equilibrium, one needs what Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) call a \sequence
of atoms". This can be thought of as an innitesimal version of the \grab-the-dollar"
game. In each round, rm i invests with a probability i, until at least one rm
invests. In this way, the possibility of a \coordination mistake" { both rms investing
simultaneously { is not ruled out ex-ante.2 It turns out that in equilibrium
i(Y ) =
L(Y )   F(Y )
L(Y )   M(Y )
:
In particular, this implies that at YP either rm invests with probability 1/2, and si-
multaneous investment does not occur (a.s.). Furthermore, the expected discounted
prot of both rms equals F(Y ), regardless of whether they invest rst or not. In
other words, rent-equalisation takes place in equilibrium.
1.2 Contribution and overview of the paper
The contribution of the paper is two-fold. On the methodological front it presents
an intuitively appealing way to analyse non-exclusive (real) options. The driving
idea behind the development is to separate { as much as possible { the optimal
stopping problems involved in standard (real) options analysis and the game theo-
retic analysis. Essentially I propose a setting where players use pure strategies to
determine when they act, but use mixed strategies to determine what happens at the
time they decide to act. A second contribution is an application of the methodology
to investment under uncertainty. In particular, the tools developed in the paper
allow for the incorporation of higher dimensional stochastic processes, which leads
to several new insights in the investment problem under uncertainty.
Early results in the literature on non-exclusive real options are often obtained
by applying the method developed in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) as if it were a
deterministic problem.3 However, due to the stochastic nature of Y , one should be
dealing with stopping times. In this paper, an attempt is made to use the ideas from
2Joint investment is referred to as a mistake, because neither rm wants it to happen, since the
leader and follower values are both larger than the value of simultaneous investment.
3A notable exception is Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003), who analyse an incomplete information
game and, therefore, use Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
5Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) to develop a notion of \subgame perfect equilibrium",
where time is essentially stochastic. In this way one can replicate the results from
the literature in an appropriate framework. In addition, the coordination device
from Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) is given a new interpretation, which makes it
appealing for use in the analysis of non-exclusive real options. A further dierence
with Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) is to replace the use of distribution functions as
part of the players' strategies by stopping sets, as suggested by Dutta and Rustichini
(1995). The strategy and equilibrium concepts are developed in Section 2.
In Section 3 the existence of a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium is proved
for non-exclusive real options with a rst-mover advantage, where the underlying
uncertainty follows a d-dimensional strong Markov process. For such non-exclusive
real options there can exist a subset of the state space where each player wants to
preempt the other. This is called the preemption region. It is in this region that the
coordination device actually comes into play. It is shown that the principle of rent-
equalisation applies in equilibrium in the preemption region. That is, the strategies
are chosen such that their expected payo equals the expected payo they would
get if they were not the rst player to exercise for sure. More in particular, it is
easily shown that the situation where each player exercises with probability 1/2 in
the preemption region is a pathological case if the stochastic process has continuous
sample paths. This indicates that caution is needed when making (exogenous) as-
sumptions on coordination as frequently happens in the literature (see, for example,
Grenadier (1996), Grenadier (2000), and Weeds (2002)).
Finally, a numerical example is presented in Section 1.1. This example is a
straightforward extension of Smets (1991), Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Chapter 9)
and Huisman (2001, Chapter 7). I consider a model of technology adoption by
rms, where players are completely symmetric up to the uncertainty that they face.
Both rms' prots are aected by a geometric Brownian motion with equal trend
and volatility. The novelty, however, is that the two processes are not perfectly
correlated. The most important consequence of this asymmetry is that it is not a
priori clear that preemption indeed takes place. In fact, a simulation study shows
that the expected time to rst investment increases (roughly) linearly in the instan-
taneous correlation. This implies that the more asymmetric the rms are, the sooner
investment takes place (in expectation). The probability of preemption occurring
in equilibrium, on the other hand, is (roughly) parabolic in the correlation. This
implies, in essence, that the competitive pressure in the market is higher when rms
are either more or less correlated.
62 Strategies, Payos, and Equilibrium
Throughout this section it is assumed that there are two players, indexed by i 2
f1;2g. The two players each hold an option of either the call or the put type. The
aim of this section is to dene an equilibrium that is the stochastic continuous time
analogue of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. From a game theoretic point of
view, the main problem in continuous time modelling is the absence of a well-dened
notion of \immediately after time t" (cf. Simon and Stinchcombe (1989)). Dutta
and Rustichini (1995) solve this problem by viewing time as being parameterised by
two variables.
Denition 1. Time is the two-dimensional set T = R+  Z+, endowed with the
lexicographic ordering, denoted by L, and the standard topology induced by L.
That is, a typical time element is a duplet t = (s;z) 2 T, which consists of a con-
tinuous and a discrete part. In the remainder, s refers to the continuous and z to
the discrete component. The continuous component s can be thought of as \real
time", on which the underlying uncertainty works, whereas z represents \coordina-
tion time", which is used by players to coordinate their actions.
2.1 The underlying asset
There are two stochastic processes that inuence the payos of players. The rst
is an exogenously given stochastic process { denoted by Y { which represent the
evolution of the \underlying asset" of the non-exclusive option. The second process
{ denoted by X { is endogenously determined by players' strategies and describes the
evolution of the sate of play. Its state space is the set  = f(0;0);(1;0);(0;1);(1;1)g.





1 if Player i has exercised the option
0 otherwise
; i = 1;2:
More formally, let (
;F) be a measurable space, with a given ltration (Ft)tL(0;0).
Note that, here, a ltration is a sequence of -elds, such that
F(s;z)  F(s0;z0)  F;
if (s;z) L (s0;z0).
For all y 2 Rd, let Py be a probability measure on (
;F) and let (Yt)tL(0;0) be
a strong Markov process dened on (
;F;Py), such that
1. (Yt)tL(0;0) is adapted to (Ft)tL(0;0),
72. (Yt)tL(0;0) takes values in (Rd;Bd), where Bd is the d-dimensional Borel -
eld,
3. for all s 2 R+ it holds that Y(s;0) = Y(s;1) =   Ys, and
4. Y(0;0) = y, Py-a.s.
So, in essence, (Yt)tL(0;0) can be created from a stochastic process in continuous
time, (Ys)s2R+ { whose sample paths are right-continuous and left-continuous over
stopping times { extended to T, such that condition 3 holds. The process (Yt)tL(0;0)
represents the evolution of the value of the asset underlying the real option. For
further reference, dene the stopping time
y(A) := inffs 2 R+jY(s;z) 2 A;Y(0;0) = y;Py-a.s.g;
for all A 2 Bd. If there is no confusion possible as to the value of y the subscript is
dropped.
2.2 Strategies and the coordination mechanism
For every y 2 Rd and x 2 , a strategy for Player i will consist of two ingredients,
namely a set Si
y;x  Rd
+, and a probability i
y;x 2 (0;1]. The set Si
y;x is referred to as
Player i's stopping set, given the initial values (y;x).4 The probability i
y;x describes
Player i's exercise intensity at time (Si
y;x). The probabilities 1
y;x and 2
y;x together
determine the evolution of a process (Xt)tL(0;0), which tracks the exercise status of
both players.
Denition 2. A Markov strategy i = (i
y;x)(y;x)2Rd for Player i, i = 1;2, species
for all y 2 Rd







y;x 2 (0;1], such that
1. Si
y;x = ;, if xi = 1;
2. i
y;x = 1, if xj = 1.
These two conditions are merely regularity conditions. The former ensures that
a player can exercise the option only once. The latter condition is imposed in
recognition of the fact that, if Player j has already exercised, Player i faces a decision-
theoretic problem and there is no need for coordination. As a further convention, it
4Note that it is not required, a priori, that the stopping set is connected. So, the model is rich
enough to include situations where the optimal exercise rule is not of the standard \optimal exercise
trigger" form.
8is assumed that y(;) = 1. The set of Markov strategies for player i is denoted by
Si. It is important to note that, typically, i
y;x can { and will { depend on Y(Si
y;x).
Let  = (1;2) 2 S1  S2. For all y 2 Rd and x 2 , the exercise intensities
1
y;x and 2




















for all s 2 Rd.
Let y := (S1
y;x) ^ (S2




(s;z) = x; for all z 2 Z+ and s < y;x: (2)
At y, the players start playing a game in coordination time to determine who
exercises the option at time y. In each round of this coordination game, Player i,
i = f1;2g, exercises the option with probability i
y;x. Play continues until at least
one player exercises the option, which happens at time
y;x := inffz 2 Z+jX
y;x
(y;z) 2 Ag;
where A = f(1;0);(0;1);(1;1)g is the set of absorbing states. After that, the state










(y;y;x); for all s > y and z 2 Z+. (4)
At time y, the state of play changes with constant transition probabilities. In
particular, if x = (0;0), the transition probabilities for (X
y;x
(y;z))z2N are denoted by


























































tL(0;0) is essentially a Markov chain, which is supported by
some probability measure P y;x on (
;F), such that X
y;x
(0;0) = x, P y;x-a.s. From the



















































It is easy to see that P y;x(y;x < 1) = 1, so that play in coordination time is
nite, P y;x-a.s. In fact, this construction allows for the exercise intensities to be
interpreted as mixed strategies in a particular normal form game, where each player
has two pure strategies, namely exercise and don't exercise. The probabilities needed
to compute the expected payos in this normal form game follow from the probability
measure in (6). This re-interpretation will be crucial in the equilibrium existence
proof in Section 3.
For x = (1;0) and x = (0;1), one player, say Player j, has already exercised the
option. This implies that y = (Si
y;x), and, consequently, that 
j
y;x = 0. At time
(Si
y;x), the resulting Markov chain has only one absorbing state, namely (1;1),
which is reached in nite time as well, because i
y;x = 1. A nal remark on the







that players essentially use pure strategies to determine when they act (they choose
a stopping set), but use mixed strategies to determine what happens via the exercise
intensity.
To summarise we get the following denition.
Denition 3. Let  = (1;2) 2 S1  S2 and (y;x) 2 Rd  . The exercise






tL(0;0), which satises (1){(5), with induced
probability measure P y;x. Furthermore, X
(0;0) = x, P 
y;x-a.s.
The class of all induced exercise processes and the family of induced probability










and P = (P y;x)2S1S2
(y;x)2Rd;
respectively.
2.2.1 Payos and Equilibrium
Given the strategies  = (1;2), the starting point (y;x) 2 Rd  , and the state
of the stochastic processes (Yt;X
y;x
t )t2T the instantaneous payo to Player i at




(Yt) 2 R. For all x 2  it is assumed that V i
x() is strictly
increasing. Since Y only changes in the continuous \real time" dimension of time,
this formulation implies that, for given x, payos are realised in real time only. Note
that the instantaneous payos are assumed to be Markovian in the sense that they
only depend on the current state of the processes Y and Xy;x.
In addition to the instantaneous payos, it is assumes that Player i incurs a sunk
cost Ii > 0, if she exercises the option. Finally, players discount payos according





tL(0;0), which is adapted to (Ft)tL(0;0), and constant over
(discrete) \coordination time" (just like the process (Yt)tL(0;0)). A non-exclusive
real option game can now be dened as follows.















For x = (0;0), the expected discounted payo of the strategies (1;2) 2 S1S2
























































































































































respectively. The payos for Player 2 are dened equivalently.
A subgame perfect equilibrium is now readily dened as follows.
Denition 5. Let   be a two-player NERO. A collection of strategies ( 1;  2) 2
S1  S2 constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) if it prescribes a Nash
equilibrium for all (y;x) 2 Rd
+  , i.e.
8i2f1;2g8i2Si8(y;x)2Rd
+ : V i
y;x( i;  j)  V i
y;x(i;  j):
M
Note that in standard extensive form games, the notion of subgame perfectness is
dened over time. Due to the strong Markov property of (Yt)tL(0;0), the denition
of SPE above could equivalently be dened over stopping times. The denition over
states, however, is more convenient due to the Markovian nature of the problem.
3 NEROs with a First Mover Advantage
In this section American-type perpetual non-exclusive call options are studied. In
the analysis that follows, several particular discounted payo functions play an im-
portant role. For x = (0;1), the follower value, F i(y), for Player i is dened to be

































12where M is the set of Markov times adapted to (Ft)tL(0;0). Let Si
F(y) denote the
optimal stopping set resulting from (7).5
Let x = (0;0). The leader value, Li(y), for Player i is the expected discounted
payo stream if Player i exercises the option at time t = (0;0), with Y(0;0) = y, given
that Player j exercises the option at time (S
j
F(y)). That is,


















L(y) be the optimal stopping set of the problem




































The optimal stopping time  in (9) is the time at which Player i would exercise
the option, if she knew that Player j could not preempt her. Preemption may take
place, however in the region Si
P(y) := fy 2 RdjLi(y)  F i(y)g.
The Markovian nature of (Yt)tL(0;0), together with the innite horizon have an
important implication for the optimal stopping sets Si
F(y) and Si
L(y). Intuitively
speaking, the process (Yt)tL(0;0) always \starts afresh". Consider the optimal stop-
ping problem for the leader. Fixing ! 2 
 and following the sample path t 7! Yt(!)
one can observe the following. Evaluating Li(Yt(!)) gives Player i enough informa-
tion to optimally decide whether to exercise the option or to wait. In other words,
the state space Rd can be split in a set C, the continuation set, and a stopping set
D = RdnC, where the option is exercised. The sets C and D are independent of the





y 2 Rd. So, in order to nd a subgame perfect equilibrium, we only have to nd a
pair (Si;i) which induces a Nash equilibrium for all x 2 , which greatly simplies
the analysis that follows. Note that, of course, the actual optimal stopping time
does depend on the starting point, so the optimal leader value does as well. The
following assumption is made on the optimal stopping sets.




5Note that it is possible that S
i
F(y) = ;.
13Thirdly, let Mi(y) denote the expected discounted value to Player i if x = (1;1)
and Y(0;0) = y, i.e.









M = fy 2 RdjMi(y)  F i(y)g be the set of payos where simultaneous invest-






The following assumptions are made with respect to the instantaneous payo
functions and the optimal stopping sets.
Assumption 2. For every Player i, i 2 f1;2g, it holds that
1. V i





The second condition ensures that, for each player, there are values for y, where
she wants to be leader rather than follower. In other words, there is a rst mover
advantage.
For further reference, let  Si
P = Si
PnSi
L (which could be an empty set) and
'i(y) =
Li(y)   F i(y)
Li(y)   Mi(y)
;
for all y 2 Rd, such that Li(y) 6= Mi(y).
Theorem 1. Let G be a two-player NERO satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2. Let y 2
Rd
+ and x 2 . Then   = ( 1
y;x;  2
y;x)(y;x)2Rd 2 S1  S2, with  i
y;x = ( Si
y;x;  i
y;x)
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F;1); if x = (0;1), and
( Si
y;x;  i
y;x) = (;;0); otherwise.
Proof. Let y 2 Rd. First, note that, for all y 2 Rd,























14since Player i can always choose  = 0. Hence, Si
M  Si
F and Si
M = fy 2
RdjMi(y) = F i(y)g. Also, the case where xi = 1 is trivial. Consider the follow-
ing cases.
1. xi = 0, xj = 1.
Since Player j has already exercised the option, Player i faces the decision theoretic
problem (7). The optimal stopping set for this problem is Si
F. The denition of
Markov strategies prescribes that i
y;x = 1. So, ( Si
y;x;  i
y;x) = (Si
F;1) is a weakly
dominant strategy.
2. x = (0;0), y 2 Si
L.
The optimal stopping problem (9) takes into account that Player j exercises as soon
as S
j
F, which is a weakly dominant strategy for Player j. Therefore, if y 2 Si
L,





3. x = (0;0), y 2  Si
P \  S
j
P.
In this case it holds that y = 0. In order to determine whether it pays for Player i
to deviate from  i
y;x to ~ i
y;x = (~ Si
y;x; ~ i
y;x), two possible deviations have to be con-
sidered:
1. Player i wants to exercise immediately, by choosing a stopping set ~ Si
y;x such
that (~ Si
y;x) = 0, but chooses ~ i
y;x 6=  i
y;x, and
2. Player j chooses a stopping set ~ Si
y;x, such that (~ Si
y;x) 6= 0.
Consider the former deviation. In this case, the players are eectively playing the
game depicted in Figure 2. The cell (continue;continue) has no payo, since this
Exercise Continue
Exercise M1(y);M2(y) L1(y);F 2(y)
Continue F 1(y);L2(y)
Figure 2: The coordination game.










y;x) are such that (Si
y;x) = (S
j














































































Figure 3: Best response correspondences.
strategy Nash equilibrium6 and, hence, unilateral deviations do not lead to higher
expected utility.
Furthermore, note that Player j's strategy is such that Player i is indierent
between exercising and not exercising. This immediately implies that the strategies







y;x) = Fi(y): (11)
On the other hand, let ~ i 6=  i be such that (~ Si
y;x) 6= 0. Then Player j exercises













So, Player i has no incentive to deviate.
4. x = (0;0), y 2 (Si








y;x) = 0. Moreover, Player j invests with probability
 
j








6Note that there are two pure-strategy equilibria as well; one where Player i becomes leader and
Player j follower with probability one, and the symmetric counter-part.
16Suppose that Player i deviates to ~ i
y;x = (~ Si
y;x; ~ i
y;x), with (~ Si
y;x) = 0. For all
~ i








= 0  Li(y) + (1   ~ a1
y;x)Fi(y) + ~ i
y;xMi(y)
 Mi(y):
For any deviation such that ( ~ Si








So, Player i has no incentive to deviate.
5. x = (0;0), y 2  Si
P \ (S
j
N [  S
j
P).
Note that, in this case y is the rst hitting time of  = Si
L [ S
j
L [ ( S1
P \  S2
P). So,
what remains to be shown is that, for all elements of , waiting until  is hit is an
equilibrium. From the above analysis it follows that, under  , the expected payo


































The only deviation ~ i of  i that could possibly lead to a higher payo has ~ Si
y;x such
that (~ Si
y;x) < y(). But, by denition, (~ Si
y;x) does not solve (9). Hence, waiting
to exercise the option is weakly dominant.
As a corollary, suppose that rms are symmetric, i.e. V 1
kl = V 2
kl  Vkl, all
k;l 2 f0;1g, and I1 = I2  I. In that case all stopping regions are the same and
the following result follows immediately from Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. Let G be a symmetric two-player NERO satisfying Assumptions 1
and 2. Let y 2 Rd
+ and x 2 . Then   = ( 1
y;x;  2
y;x)(y;x)2Rd 2 S1  S2, with
 i
y;x = ( Si
y;x;  i





> > > > > > <







if y 2 SP
(SF;1) otherwise
; if x = (0;0),
( Si
y;x;  i
y;x) = (SF;1); if xi = 0, xj = 1, and
( Si
y;x;  i
y;x) = (;;0); otherwise.
17In the case that (Yt)tL(0;0) is one-dimensional, a typical plot of the payo func-
tions would look like Figure 1, where y < YF, SF = [YF;1), SN = [0;YP), and
 SP = [YP;YF). If, in addition, x = (0;0), y 2 SN, and (Yt)tL(0;0) has continuous











Note that if (Yt)tL(0;0) exhibits jumps, there can be a positive probability that both
players exercise simultaneously in the preemption region.
From Theorem 1 it follows that there are four possible exercise scenarios, depend-
ing on which subset of the state-space Rd is reached rst. For a two-dimensional



















































Figure 4: Exercise regions with a two-dimensional underlying asset.
both players exercise simultaneously if Y 2 S1
L \ S2
L. In such cases the option is
so deep in the money that it becomes optimal for each player to exercise regardless
of the actions of the other player. Since strategic considerations do not play a role
in this scenario I refer to it as monopolistic simultaneous exercise. Note that, if the
sample paths of Y are continuous and Y0 62 S1
L \ S2
L, this scenario will not occur
(a.s.).




L)c. In this case, Player i exercises the option as if she was an exogenously
determined leader. It is referred to as monopolistic sequential exercise.
18If Y 2  S1
P \  S2
P,7 neither player nds the option deep enough in the money to
optimally exercise. Due to the threat of preemption, however, at least one player
exercises along every equilibrium path. Therefore, this set is called the preemp-
tion region. Note that from (11) it follows that, in equilibrium, expected payos
in the preemption region are equal to the follower payos for both players. This
phenomenon is called rent-equalisation. So, ex ante, both players expect their fol-
lower payo. In every realisation, however, three possible outcomes occur. In two
outcomes one player exercises rst, while the other players waits until the option is
deep enough in the money to be the follower. These scenarios are called preemptive
sequential exercise. Finally, it is possible that both players exercise simultaneously
(if p11 > 0). In that case there is preemptive simultaneous exercise.
4 Technology Adoption in an Industry with Asymmet-
ric Uncertainty
Consider a market with two rms, both of whom have an option to invest in a new
technology. It is assumed that the discounted prot stream of Firm i equals
i(y;x) = iV i
x(y);



















where z1 and z2 are independent Wiener processes. Let 2
k = 2
k1 +2
k2, k = 1;2, be















The discount factor for Firm i, i = 1;2, is assumed to follow
di
i =  idt   i
1dz1   i
2dz2:
The instantaneous prots are taken to be linear in yi, so V i
kl(Y ) = DklYi, for
all Y 2 R2
+, and k;l 2 f0;1g. Note that the deterministic parts are assumed to be
equal for both rms and are taken such that
1. D10 > D11 > D00  D01,







192. D10   D00 > D11   D01.
These are standard assumptions to model a game with a rst-mover advantage (cf.
Huisman (2001)). Finally, sunk costs are the same for both rms and equal to
I > 0. That is, rms are symmetric up to the uncertainty that underlies their
prots { which, in turn, are correlated { and their discount factors.













=   (i + i1i
1 + i2i
2   i)dt
+ (i1   i
1)dz1 + (i2   i
2)dz2
   iidt + (i1   i
1)dz1 + (i2   i
2)dz2;
(12)
where ii is the convenience yield of Firm i with respect to Yi. Also dene the
convenience yield of Firm i with respect to Yj,
ij = i + i
1j1 + i
2j2   j:
It is assumed throughout that ii > 0 and ij > 0. From (12) it follows that the
value of simultaneous exercising of the option to Firm i equals











First, I derive the follower value, F i(Yi), for Firm i. Note that this value does not
depend on Yj, since Firm j has already exercised her option. The value of exercising
the option { the option's \strike price" { at y 2 R2
+ is Mi(y). Denote the value the
option to exercise at y by Ci
F(y). Then, the no-arbitrage value (relative to i) of
Ci
F() should satisfy (cf. Cochrane (2005)),
iD01Yidt + I EPy[diCi
F] = 0
() D01Yidt + I EPy[dCi




































































i (   1) + (i   ii)   i = 0:
Under the standard boundary condition, limyi#0 Ci
F(y) = 0, and the value-matching
and smooth-pasting conditions (cf. Peskir and Shiryaev (2006)) it is obtained that
Si
F = fY 2 R2



















ii yi if yi < Y i
F
D11
ii yi   I if yi  Y i
F.
4.2 Leader Value
Having established the value for the follower I now turn to the leader value. In de-
riving the leader value I assume that Firm j cannot invest before Firm i. Therefore,
the leader value for Firm i can only be computed when yj < Y
j
F. If Firm i becomes
the leader, then, by denition, Firm j becomes the follower. The exercise decision
of Firm j, which depends on yj, as we saw, inuences the prot of Firm i. Hence,
her leader value depends on yi and yj.
The no-arbitrage value of Li(y) follows

































































8For f(x1;x2), let fi() =
@f()













j(   1) + (i   ij)   i = 0:
If yj = 0, then the threshold Y
j
F will never be reached and, hence, Firm i will
receive D10 over the time interval [0;1). This leads to the boundary condition
limyj#0 Li(y) = D10
ii yi   I. This implies that AL
ii = BL
ij = 0. Also, if yi = 0,
then Firm i only incurs the sunk costs. This leads to the boundary condition
limyi#0 Li(y) =  I, which implies BL
ii = 0. Finally, if yj = Y
j
F, then both rms exer-
















yi   I: (15)
Note that the second term in (15) is a correction for the possibility that Firm j may
exercise its option as well at some time in the future.
The value function in (15) is the strike price of the option to Firm i of becoming
the leader and can, therefore, be used to derive the optimal stopping set Si
L in the
following way. For y 2 Si
N, let Ci(y) denote the option value of Firm i of exercising
the option with strike price governed by (15). The no-arbitrage value of Ci(y) follows




































































F will never be reached and, hence, Firm i will receive D00 over the time
interval [0;1). This leads to the boundary condition limy#(0;0) Ci(y) = D00
ii yi. This
implies that Bii = Bij = 0. The value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions, in
this case, are 8
> > > <




























The following lemma establishes the existence of a rst-mover advantage.
Lemma 1. For i 2 f1;2g and Yj  Y
j
F, it holds that Si
F  Si
L.
Proof. Let Yj = Y
j




















I = Y i
F:
Furthermore, it is easy to see that
@Y i
L(Yj)
@Yj  0, for Yj < Y
j
F. Hence, for all Yj  Y
j
F,
it holds that Y i
L(Yj) < Y i
F.
For every Yj  Y
j
F, let Y i
P(Yj) be the solution of the equation Li(Y i
P(Yj);Yj) =
Fi(Y i











By construction of (15) it holds that Y i
P(Yj)  Y i





L. In other words, the conditions in Assumptions 1{2 are satised
and Theorem 1 provides an equilibrium for this NERO.
A further result can be obtained. Recall that  Si
P = Si
PnSi
L is the preemption
region. The following lemma establishes that this region is non-empty.
Lemma 2. It holds that  S1
P \  S2
P 6= ;.
Proof. Let A = [0;Y 1
L(Y 2
F)]  [0;Y 2
L(Y 1
F)] and dene the function f : A ! R2,
where, for i = 1;2, fi(y) = F i(yi) Li(y). Note that for i = 1;2 and Yj 2 [0;Y 2
L(Y 1
F)],




F);yj) < Fi(Y i
F)   Li(Y i
F;yj) = 0 (17)
fi(0;yj) = I > 0 (18)
23Since A is a convex and compact set, and f is a continuous function, there exists a
stationary point on A (cf. Eaves (1971)), i.e.
9y2A8y2A : yf(y)  yf(y): (19)
Let i 2 f1;2g. Suppose that y
i > 0. Then there exists " > 0, such that y =
y   "ei 2 A, where ei is the i-th unit vector. From (19) it then follows that
yf(y)   yf(y) =  "fi(y)  0 () fi(y)  0: (20)
Similarly, if y
i < Y i
L(Y
j
F), there exists " > 0, such that y = y +"ei 2 A. Therefore,
yf(y)   yf(y) = "fi(y)  0 () fi(y)  0: (21)
Hence, from (20) and (21) it follows that f(y) = 0, if y 2 An@A.
Suppose that y
i = 0, and let y 2 A be such that yj = y
j. Then (19) implies that
(y   y)f(y) = yifi(y)  0 () fi(y)  0, which contradicts (18). Similarly,
supposing that y
i = Y i
L(Y
j
F), and taking y 2 A such that yi = y
i, it is obtained that
(y  y)f(y) = (yi  y
i)fi(y)  0 () fi(y)  0, which contradicts (17). Hence,
there exists y 2 An@A, such that Li(y) = Fi(y
i ), i = 1;2.
4.3 A Numerical Illustration
Consider the case with payos, sunk costs, and parameters as given in Table 1.
It is assumed that both rms have the same discount factor, 1 = 2  . It
(D10;D11;D00;D01) = (8;5;3;1) I = 100
 = 0:04  = (0:05;0:05)





Table 1: Model characteristics.
is, furthermore, assumed that Firm 1 is only inuenced by z1, whereas Firm 2's
payos are inuenced by both shocks. This could correspond to a situation where
Firm 1 is a domestic rm, with an option to invest in a new product, and Firm 2
is a foreign rm with a similar option. The Wiener process z2 can represent, for
example, exchange rate risk.
The resulting optimal stopping regions and the preemption region are depicted
in Figure 4. Starting at Y0 = y 2 S1
N \S2
N, note that, since Y has continuous sample
paths, in equilibrium there is always one rm which does not exercise the option at
time y(), a.s.9 It is, however, not the case that in the preemption region both




L [ ( S
1
P \  S
2
P).
24rms exercise with probability 0.5, as is the case in papers where it is assumed that
rms toss a fair coin to determine who exercises rst in the preemption region.10 In
fact, conditional on y() = y( S1
P \  S2
P), the probability that both rms exercise
with probability 0.5 is equal to 0. This is the case since P(X
y;x
(y;y;x) = (1;0)) =
P(X
y;x
(y;y;x) = (0;1)) only if '1(Yy()) = '2(Yy()) = 0, because there is always
one rm for whom 'i(Yy()) = 0. There is only one point where this happens,
namely at the intersection of Y 1
P(Y2) and Y 2
P(Y1). Due to absolute continuity, this
point is reached with zero probability.
So, three investment scenarios can occur with positive probability. These are
(i) monopolistic sequential investment (by either rm), (ii) preemptive sequential
investment (by either rm), and (iii) preemptive simultaneous investment. The pre-
cise probabilities of each scenario occurring depend on the underlying fundamentals.
This analysis shows that is dicult to judge the competitiveness of a market based
on ex post observed investment behaviour. For example, simultaneous investment is
not necessarily a sign of tacit collusion. It could very well happen in a preemptive
environment.
To examine the inuence of the instantaneous correlation between z1 and z2
on investment timing and competition, the following simulation experiment is con-
ducted. The same parameter values as before are chosen, with i;j = 0:05, all
i;j = 1;2, 11 = 0:2, and 12 = 0. This time, however, it is assumed that 2 = 0:2,
but that the loadings on z1 and z2 vary with . So, rms are symmetric, but for the
loading of the respective risk they face on the factors z1 and z2.
For every value  2 ( 1;1), 1,000 sample paths of Y are generated. The starting
point of the process Y is always taken to be (0:15;0:15). In Figure 5, the expected
time to (rst) investment and the probability of preemption (as opposed to a scenario
where either rm acts as if it were a monopolist) are plotted as functions of .
The correlation between shocks can indicate what kind of industry is being in-
vestigated. If shocks are perfectly negatively correlated, for example, one might be
dealing with a situation where both rms oer goods that are perfect substitutes.
The prot of one rm goes up when the prot of the other goes down. Conversely, if
shocks are perfectly positively correlated, one might be looking at an industry with
homogenous goods. If the shocks are uncorrelated, the two rms seem to operate in
unconnected markets.
Firstly, the left-panel of Figure 5 indicates that the expected time to rst in-
vestment increases with . So, the more integrated the industry, the longer it takes
{ in expectation { until (rst) investment takes place. The right-panel of Figure 5
10See, for example, Grenadier (1996) or Weeds (2002)









































Figure 5: Expected investment time (left-panel) and probability of preemption
(right-panel) as a function of the instantaneous correlation .
shows the probability of investment scenarios (ii) or (iii) occurring. That is, the
probability that Yy 2  S1
P \  S2
P. Intuitively, it measures the preemptive pressure in
the industry. It appears that preemptive pressure is lowest if the two markets are
uncorrelated. This is of course what one would expect. It is, however, striking that
there is no one-to-one relation between the expected time of rst investment and the
preemptive pressure in the industry. If, namely, goods become more substitutable
( 1 <  < 0 and decreasing) expected time to investment goes down, while preemp-
tive pressure goes up. This is what one would intuitively expect. If, however, goods
become more homogenous (0 <  < 1 and increasing) expected time goes up even
though preemptive pressure increases.
5 Conclusion
In this paper a general model for two-player non-exclusive real option games with
rst mover advantages has been introduced. The strategy and equilibrium concepts
are based on ideas from Dutta and Rustichini (1995) and Fudenberg and Tirole
(1985). The advantage of using a coordination device in the spirit of Fudenberg and
Tirole (1985) is that it allows one to endogenously solve for a particular coordination
problem that often arises in preemption games. The basic idea is that if a coordina-
tion problem arises, the two players engage in a game in \coordination time", which
leads to an absorbing Markov chain. The probabilities with which each player ex-
26ercises the option are then simply given by the limit distribution of this chain. The
main result of the paper, Theorem 1, proves the validity of the rent-equalisation
principle in NEROs with rst-mover advantages, where uncertainty is governed by
a strong Markovian stochastic process.
Most of the present literature on game-theoretic real option models assumes that
uncertainty is represented by a one-dimensional geometric Brownian motion. This
paper shows that the qualitative results change signicantly if a two-dimensional
GBM is used. In fact, in much of the literature on non-exclusive real options the co-
ordination device is not used, but exogenous assumptions are made on the resolution
of the coordination problem instead. Usually it is argued that a fair coin is tossed
and each player exercises with probability 1/2. It seems that such assumptions are
based on Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) who show that this is the case in the particular
(deterministic, symmetric players) model they study. In a purely symmetric model
with non-exclusive real options and one-dimensional GBM this is indeed true. With
a two-dimensional GBM, however, the coordination problem arises as well and, in
equilibrium, neither player exercises with probability 1/2 (a.s.). Furthermore, both
players exercise with unequal probability (a.s.). It is still the case, however, that
both players do not exercise simultaneously (a.s.) as is a standard result (or indeed
assumption) in the current literature. This is due to the continuous sample paths of
GBM.
The analysis in this paper opens up several avenues for future research. Firstly,
the actual behaviour of the model for particular stochastic processes can be exam-
ined. Of particular interest would be the situation where Y follows a jump-diusion
process. In the models currently studied in the literature the probability of both
players jointly exercising is zero, due to continuity of sample paths. This property
would be lost in jump-diusion model. This might consequently lead to an additional
value of waiting.
Secondly, the model in Section 4 could be used to analyse specic economic prob-
lems. A straightforward one is the question whether currency unions, or currency
pegging, accelerates investment. In the setting of Section 4 one can think of two
rms, a domestic one and a foreign one. The domestic rm is exposed to one source
of risk, say product-market risk due to demand uctuations, whereas the foreign rm
is also exposed to exchange rate risk. A monetary union would take away the latter
source of risk and lead to a duopoly as analysed in Huisman (2001, Chapter 7). The
expected rst and second exercise times could be simulated and a welfare analysis
could be made to compare both situations.
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